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H I G H L I G H T S
• A novel analytic synthesis of arguments that support random allocation as an alternative to grant peer review.• Review of policy implementations of science funding that formally include a random selection element.• A novel comparison of these policies with the policy-relevant characteristics of the arguments in the literature.
A B S T R A C T
In 2013 the Health Research Council of New Zealand began a stream of funding titled ‘Explorer Grants’, and in 2017 changes were introduced to the funding mechanisms
of the Volkswagen Foundation ‘Experiment!’ and the New Zealand Science for Technological Innovation challenge ‘Seed Projects’. All three funding streams aim at
encouraging novel scientific ideas, and all now employ random selection by lottery as part of the grant selection process. The idea of funding science by lottery emerged
independently in several corners of academia, including in philosophy of science. This paper reviews the conceptual and institutional landscape in which this policy
proposal emerged, how different academic fields presented and supported arguments for the proposal, and how these have been reflected (or not) in actual policy. The
paper presents an analytical synthesis of the arguments presented to date, notes how they support each other and shape policy recommendations in various ways, and
where competing arguments highlight the need for further analysis or more data. In addition, it provides lessons for how philosophers of science can engage in shaping
science policy, and in particular, highlights the importance of mixing complementary expertise: it takes a (conceptually diverse) village to raise (good) policy.
1. Introduction
As many of the other papers in this collected volume argue, scien-
tific novelty, even in its more extreme ‘maverick’ variety, is an im-
portant collective epistemic good. As such, we should spend time
thinking about the processes and institutions that encourage or dis-
courage it, and support policies that, all else being equal, increase sci-
entific novelty.1 One cluster of institutions that affect scientific novelty
are the institutions that decide and implement science funding policy: if
novel projects are not funded, or if scientists do not apply to work on
novel projects, the overall novelty of the scientific community de-
creases. Criticisms that the current dominant funding method, grant
peer review, has an adverse effect on scientific novelty are not new.
What is newer is the emergence of academic arguments that support
alternative funding mechanisms, specifically with the aim of increasing
scientific novelty, though these have also been around for a couple of
decades. Newer still are implementations of these alternative mechan-
isms as actual funding policies around the world.
This paper looks at one such mechanism, the introduction of
random selection into the funding process of research projects. §2
outlines the institutional landscape of science funding, and highlights
the significance of the emergence of alternatives to the dominant me-
chanism of grant peer review. §3 recaps the arguments that have been
put forward in the academic literature in support of random allocation
as an alternative to grant peer review. §4 presents an analytic synthesis
of these arguments and shows where they diverge in their assumptions
and where evidence is scarce. §5 surveys policy implementations of
science funding that formally include a random selection element. §6
compares the surveyed policies against each other and against the
policy-relevant characteristics of the arguments in the literature. §7
makes a brief note of the chain of publications, evidenced in the citation
record, from some of the arguments in the literature to implemented
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1 As a reviewer has keenly pointed out, this is left ambiguous with regards to the optimal level of novelty: is novelty an unalloyed good? From a Bayesian
perspective, that seems indeed to be the case: given two statements with the same a posteriori credence, the one with lower a priori credence is the more valuable one,
as it brings us closer to an accurate model. However, society does not care just about the value of information: there is a cost to be paid for changing one's beliefs and
actions (even when the change is for the better), and there is a cost to be paid for entertaining, even in passing, low-credence ideas; see, e.g, Polanyi (1962) on the
trade-off between novelty and ex ante plausibility, two key components of scientific merit. The current paper therefore commits to the weaker claim, that there is
value to be gained from increasing the level of novelty in contemporary scientific practice.
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policy. The aim of the paper is to make two arguments: the first, that
there is a coherent justification for encouraging scientific novelty by
introducing formal randomness into research funding mechanisms,
though much uncertainty remains regarding specific policy details; the
second, that the arguments that policy have so far picked up on have
taken place outside the philosophy of science, and that now is an op-
portune moment for philosophers of science to join this inter-
disciplinary debate.
2. Context of science funding policy
2.1. The landscape of science funding
Investment in Research and Development (R&D) is a substantial
global phenomenon. In developed countries, such as the United States of
America (USA), Japan, South Korea, and the western member countries
of the European Union (EU), spending on R&D is often in the range of
2–3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).2 This number takes into
account both public (government) spending and private (industry)
spending. When taking the significant GDPs of these countries into ac-
count, we arrive at a global R&D investment of roughly $1.7 trillion.3
Spending on R&D is not homogeneous: it can be divided by source of
funding, and by type of research. While boundaries between divisions may
be blurry, certain distinct categories of R&D funding emerge. The rationale
for funding in each category, and the philosophical analysis of desiderata
and appropriate mechanisms, may differ between these categories.
The first important distinction to be made within R&D spending is
between the sources of funds: public funds, generally originating from
tax collection and allocated by the government, and private funds,
generated mainly from corporate profit or charitable donations, and
expended by for-profit or not-for-profit private organisations. In USA R
&D expenditure, the private sector (including charities and universities’
own funds) accounts for just under three quarters of total R&D
spending, with the dominant private provider by far being industry
(65.2% of USA R&D), whereas the public sector (federal and local
government) funds just over a quarter of USA R&D.
A second distinction within R&D expenditure is the kind of research
or development work taking place. While assignment of individual
projects into any category can prove challenging, most within the R&D
policy world recognise categories that are similar to the three char-
acters of work defined by the USA National Science Foundation (NSF):
Basic Research: Research that seeks to gain more complete
knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phe-
nomena and of observable facts, without specific applications to-
ward processes or products in mind.
Applied Research: Research aimed at knowledge necessary for
determining the means by which a recognised need may be met.
Development: The systematic use of the knowledge or under-
standing gained from research, directed toward the production of
useful materials, devices, systems, or methods, including design and
development of prototypes and processes.
(Kennedy, 2012, pp. 4–5, changed styling for clarity).
Somewhat cutting across these categories is the more recently in-
troduced category of ‘transformative research’, defined by the United
States National Science Board as:
a range of endeavors which promise extraordinary outcomes, such as:
revolutionizing entire disciplines; creating entirely new fields; or
disrupting accepted theories and perspectives – in other words, those
endeavors which have the potential to change the way we address
challenges in science, engineering, and innovation (NSB, 2007).
From the perspective of this special issue, transformative research is
rich in scientific novelty, and has a certain ‘maverick’ character. While
applied research and development projects can have revolutionary ef-
fects, from a policy perspective transformative research is most closely
related to basic research, in terms of its high-risk high-reward char-
acter, its long term time horizon for impact, and its positive impact
outside of the domain in which it was first conceived, all factors which
make it unappealing for for-profit organisations (Arrow, 1962). While
statistics on transformative research are harder to come by, we can refer
to statistics on basic research as a proxy.
Basic research is only a minor component of global R&D. As discussed
above, about two thirds of R&D funds in the USA are provided by private
industry. Almost all of these funds are directed towards technological
development in a few high-tech sectors, and very little (7%) is directed
towards basic research, though that amount still makes up 26% of basic
research funding. The major supporter of basic research in the USA is the
public, via the federal government, which provides 47% of basic research
funds.4 Universities, colleges and charities provide 27% of basic research
funds, and the rest comes from local government. The largest single in-
stitutions supporting basic research, both in the USA and in the world,
are federally funded agencies, of which two are particularly dominant:
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the NSF.5 Both NIH and NSF
explicitly state they seek and support transformative research, through a
range of funding channels (NIH, 2017; NSF, 2017).
2.2. Desiderata for a public science funding mechanism
Before proceeding to discuss the merits and shortcomings of dif-
ferent science funding mechanisms, we should consider the properties
of a good funding mechanism. The following list of desiderata is
adapted from Chubin (1994); Cole, Cole, and Rubin (1977); Martino
(1992), and is based on surveys of practicing scientists6
Effectiveness: The mechanism should be effective at identifying
high quality research. The results of effective allocation would be
that high quality research is supported, leading to scientific progress
and new knowledge.
Efficiency: All parties involved would prefer, ceteris paribus, for the
process to be as efficient as possible, meaning for it to require as little
time and resources while providing an adequate level of effectiveness.
This applies both to the time and resources on the reviewing side (ad-
ministration, internal and external reviewers) and the applicants' side.
Accountability: Funders want the allocation process to maintain
accountability, to make sure scientists are spending the funds in
ways that would further scientific research, to make sure they re-
main within the bounds of the project outlined in their proposal,
that due process is followed in the allocation process, and that laws
and regulations are adhered to, e.g. regarding treatment of human
and animal subjects.
Fairness: The allocation mechanism should distribute funds fairly,
meaning it should not unjustifiably discriminate against any in-
dividual or group.
2.3. The process of funding by peer review
Both of the leading institutions in funding of global basic research,
2 All statistics in this section are from NSB (2016), for fiscal year 2013, in
2016 PPP US dollars.
3 Total national R&D expenditure: US$456.1 billion (largest), China $336.5
billion (second largest); All EU nations combined $342.4 billion.
4 Note, though, that this amount only makes up 31% of the federal R&D
budget, as much goes into supporting applied R&D in industries that cannot
easily be privatised, such as defence and energy.
5 Expenditure on basic research: NIH $14.7 billion, NSF $4.4 billion.
6 Chubin's list of desiderata also includes Responsiveness, Rationality and
Reliability, but I see these as sub-components of effectiveness.
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NIH and NSF, allocate funding by a scheme of project choice called peer
review, where research proposals originating from practising scientists
are reviewed and ranked by other scientists working in the same or
adjacent fields of research (their ‘peers’). The following summary of the
operation of peer review is based on consideration of the application
and review process at several governmental science funding agencies,
including NIH (2013a,b), NSF (2013a,b), the Australian National
Health and Medical Research Council (Graves, Barnett, & Clarke, 2011),
and the Austrian Science Fund (Dinges, 2005).
The process of resource allocation for basic research by peer review
is the dominant contemporary form of resource allocation for scientific
projects, the ‘gold standard’ of science funding. Some aspects of the
process are strongly conserved across nations and institutions:
Investigator freedom: Project proposals originate from the in-
vestigators, not dictated by the funding body or a central organising
committee. The extent to which investigators are free to design
projects is limited under various guideline constraints, but there are
many opportunities for significant levels of freedom.
Individual projects: As proposals originate from the investigators,
they arrive at the funding body as discrete, compartmentalised funding
opportunities. The funding bodies have the role of choosing among
them, but they do not, to any significant extent, coordinate between
different investigators to form overarching research programmes.
Information provision: As proposals originate from the investigators,
they must inform the funding body about the contents and merits of
their proposed projects. This is often done using a detailed written
research plan, accompanied by various supporting documents.
Peer assessment: Funding bodies seek the expert opinion of one or
more scientists in evaluating the merit of the proposed projects.
While there are guidelines for component categories of evaluation,
the decisions are still significantly subjective, i.e., not algorithmic or
box-ticking.
Integration of assessments: Often assessment is sought from more
than one source, e.g. multiple reviewers or a mix of internal and
external reviewers. The different assessments are always combined
in some way to form a single judgement per proposal, which is then
compared to the judgements of other proposals.
Ranking and cutoff: There are never enough resources to fund all
projects proposed. As such, comparisons of integrated assessments
are used to decide which projects will get funded and which will not.
Other aspects of the process exhibit more variability, such as the
identities of reviewers, the method of integrating assessments, and the
guidelines for merit evaluation. Nonetheless, the practice of science
funding by peer review is very strongly entrenched, as it has been around
since World War Two (Agar, 2012; Greenberg, 1999, 2003). Given the
emphasis of grant peer review on the ability and responsibility of sci-
entific experts to select research projects for funding, the proposal to
select projects for funding at random seems very odd in contrast.
2.4. Criticisms of grant peer review
Chubin and Hackett (1990) present a critical examination of grant
peer review, based on evidence from surveys of practising scientists.
Their stated aim is to overcome the nearly-mythical standing of peer
review as a pillar of modern science, and to highlight the fact that very
little has been done to subject peer review to methodical analysis, de-
spite known tensions and probable shortcomings. This paucity of evi-
dence regarding the effectiveness of peer review persists to this day, as
was reported in a recent comprehensive literature review (Guthrie,
Ghiga, & Wooding, 2017).
The main argument of Chubin and Hackett is that peer review serves
a function for multiple stakeholders, each having slightly different ex-
pectations from the process and its products. These different desiderata
are often in tension with each other, and so the process of peer review
often fails to fully satisfy any of the desiderata, to the chagrin of sta-
keholders. Chubin and Hackett note, using survey data, an increase in
the concern scientists and other stakeholders report regarding peer
review. However, they note that as total success rates of applicants in
grant peer review declined, because the increase in the scientific cohort
size outpaced growth of allocated funds, pressure increased within the
scientific community, which led to increased scrutiny of the allocation
mechanism, though it was not any feature of peer review per se that
caused the increase in pressure. Nonetheless, the increased attention to
peer review brought to the fore explicit statements about what different
parties considered the proper function of peer review, and what were
the perceived shortcomings in fulfilling this function.
In the two decades since Chubin's surveys such pressures have only
increased, as discussed in the next section, leading to the current ex-
periments with alternative funding models such as funding by lottery.
3. Arguments for random allocation
3.1. Greenberg
Greenberg (1998) presented the first argument in an academic
journal (to my knowledge) for funding science by lottery. In a short
piece in The Lancet, Greenberg, a science journalist and author of sev-
eral books on the politics of science, enumerates many of the common
complaints against peer review. These include time and resource costs,
peer review being close to random anyway, and lack of evidence sup-
porting the claim that peer review is a good way to pick meritorious
projects, including some deeper concerns about the possibility of con-
ducting meaningful studies on the counterfactuals involved. So far,
these have appeared time and again, including in the published lit-
erature (Cole et al., 1977; Martino, 1992).
However, Greenberg follows the criticism with (what was then) a
novel proposal:
So, as a first step towards either verifying peer review or moving on
to a better system, the powers that be should slice off some re-
spectable percentage of the research funds – say, 15–20% over 5
years – and set them aside. These funds would be awarded by lottery
to applicant scientists whose qualifications and projects have been
certified as respectable, ratings easily determined at a small fraction
of the cost of peer review.
Details aside, the basic principle is clear; instead of dodging the fact
that chance plays a big part in awarding money, the system will
sanctify chance as the determining factor. After a few years, let's
look back and evaluate the science that came out of this system.
If it's no worse than what we're getting now, let's chuck peer review,
and thereby save a lot of needless effort and money (Greenberg,
1998, p. 686).
Some of the key features in Greenberg's proposal will keep recur-
ring, so it is useful to break these down:
Pilot of random allocation: The change to the existing system
should start with a small pilot that will employ a formal random
element, and results will be compared to the results of peer review.
Randomness of peer review: The low reliability of peer review as a
measure of merit means it will not significantly outperform a lottery.7
Efficiency advantage: A lottery will be cheaper and faster than
existing peer review.
Pre-lottery screening: Not all scientists and not all projects should
be admitted to the lottery. There should be some quality check,
7 Greenberg, and many later authors, tie this low reliability to low success
percentages, such that reviewers are asked to differentiate between the top
applicants.
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though this is expected to be much less time- and cost-intensive
compared to peer review of proposals.
The entire piece can be summarised by one of its opening sentences,
in Greenberg's characteristic style:
[W]hen it comes to providing research money, there's got to be a
better way than the cumbersome, snail-paced, expensive, and un-
proven peer review derby long in effect in the USA and elsewhere.
Why not try a lottery among qualified researchers?
3.2. Brezis
Nearly a decade later, Brezis (2007) presented an economic model-
based proposal for introducing a random element into R&D project
selection. Brezis focused on criticisms of the effectiveness of peer re-
view due to bias, and especially on concerns regarding a conservative
bias in peer review. This bias tends to direct funds to low-risk projects,
underfunding highly innovative projects that could lead to significant
progress, but are also more likely to fail (the kind of novel, or ‘ma-
verick’, research this issue is focused on).
Brezis' paper presents three quantitative models to explore efficient al-
location of R&D funds. In the first model, all reviewers are the same, and
applications can be clearly delineated into two pools: innovations (gradual
improvements on existing knowledge) and inventions (radically novel
technologies). The value of each project is composed of three components:
its distance from existing technologies (the greater the better), its cleverness,
and its degree of inventiveness (which only inventions have). Reviewers are
assumed to be able to correctly assess distance and cleverness, but are un-
able to assess inventiveness, such that a flat (and, on average, too low)
inventiveness score is assigned to inventions. Under such assumptions, re-
viewers are likely to underscore inventions, resulting in lost effectiveness.
The proposed solution is to separate the inventions from the funding pool
(focalisation) and select from amongst them by lottery (randomisation); the
remaining innovations are ranked and funded as usual. This method, that
relies on expert assessment to select a subsection of proposals to enter into a
lottery, is labelled by Brezis as ‘focal randomisation’.
In Brezis' second model, reviewers are no longer assumed to be equal.
They vary in their degree of diligence, such that more diligent reviewers
spend more time on their reviews and arrive at more accurate assess-
ments of distance. In the third model reviewers are also allowed to vary
in their creativeness, such that more creative reviewers are better able to
assess the inventiveness of proposals. With this increased and variable
ability to assess the value of proposals, Brezis suggests that the high-
value inventions will be occasionally highly ranked, but only by some
(more diligent and creative) reviewers. These will show up in the ranked
list of proposals as mid-ranking with high variability between reviewers,
whereas high quality innovations will be consistently scored highly, and
low-quality proposals will be consistently scored low. The information
from the reviewers, both in terms of score averages and in terms of
variability, can be used to transfer those proposals about which reviewers
disagree into a lottery, while also funding the unanimously high-scored
top-ranking proposals. This version of focal randomisation does not rely
on reviewers’ ability to tell apart in advance which proposals are in-
novations and which are inventions, but rather leverages the variance in
reviewer scores as a proxy for this distinction.
Brezis shows, with worked numerical examples, that focal rando-
misation provides better outcomes than the alternative of straightfor-
wardly funding according to aggregated reviewers’ scores. This result is
robust across the models, and stems from the ability of random selec-
tion to pick highly innovative projects, which is something reviewers
(at least in the models) struggle to do.
On top of making a clear policy recommendation, two further fea-
tures should be noted about Brezis’ argument:
Bounded reviewer ability: Reviewers in Brezis' models are not able
to ascertain the true value of proposed projects. This lack of relia-
bility is further analysed by breaking down both features of proposal
merit (cleverness, distance, inventiveness) and reviewer character-
istics (creativity, diligence).
Link between lack of epistemic access and randomisation: The
reason focal randomisation is superior to straightforward peer re-
view in Brezis' models is that reviewers make inaccurate evaluations
of proposals' values, and these inaccuracies are systemic – some
projects, namely inventions, simultaneously have high intrinsic
value and low epistemic access, leading to a conservative bias. Focal
randomisation leverages information that is available, such as score
variability, to identify those regions of low epistemic access, and
directs them to a lottery. This results in higher effectiveness, in terms
of the value of projects chosen, compared to peer review.
Consensus precludes randomisation: As an extension of the above
point, when reviewers agree that a proposal should be accepted or
rejected, this indicates good epistemic access to the true value of the
proposal, and obviates the need for randomisation.
While she focuses on conservative bias, Brezis concludes that focal
randomisation could also help ameliorate further biases, expanding the
virtues of random allocation beyond effectiveness and into fairness:
It could also be that referees choose projects in which they are not
completely disinterested. They could act not in the public interest
exclusively, but might have self-interest, and might, for some sub-
jective reason, dislike a project. […] This ‘public choice’ perspective
would strengthen the importance of introducing randomization, into
which no elements of sympathy, approval or power enter.
Randomization on the projects where referees disagree not only
increases diversity, but is a way of avoiding the tendency to accept
projects of ‘club’ insiders (Brezis, 2007, p. 15).
3.3. Barnett, Graves, Clarke, Herbert and Blakely
Barnett, Graves, Clarke, Herbert and Blakely are public health and
biomedical researchers who set out to collect up-to-date and reliable
evidence on the shortcomings of grant peer review, mainly its lack of
reliability or high randomness (Graves et al., 2011) and its low efficiency
or high costs (Herbert, Barnett, Clarke, & Graves, 2013).
Graves et al. (2011) presents the most thorough measurement pub-
lished to date of the variability of grant peer review scores.8 The authors
used the raw peer review scores assigned by individual panel members to
2705 grant proposals. All proposals were submitted to the National
Health and Medical Research Council of Australia (NHMRC) in 2009. The
scores were given by reviewers sitting on panels of seven, nine, or eleven
members, and the average score of the panel was used to decide whether
a project was funded or not, based on its rank relative to other proposals.
The authors used a bootstrap method to generate a counterfactual
population of possible review scores for each proposal, yielding a mean
and a variance in that mean, and a confidence interval around the
mean. This confidence interval, labelled by the authors the ‘score in-
terval’, was then compared to the funding cut-off line: proposals whose
score interval was consistently above or consistently below the funding
line were considered ‘efficiently classified’ by the review system,
whereas proposals whose score interval straddled the funding line were
considered as problematic, or ‘variably/randomly classified’.
The results showed that overall, 61% of proposals were never funded
(score interval was consistently below the funding line), 9% were always
funded (score interval consistently above the funding line), and 29%
were sometimes funded (score interval straddling the funding line).
8 An earlier review paper by Cicchetti (1991) covers various measurements
with smaller sample sizes.
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In the authors' opinion, the discrepancy between the observed levels
of variability, and the importance of funding decisions to individuals'
careers, is cause for concern. The authors claim the results show “a high
degree of randomness”, with “relatively poor reliability in scoring” (p.
3). The authors follow with a list of possible improvements to the peer
review system. One of their suggestions is to investigate the use of a
(limited) lottery, similar to Brezis’ focal randomisation:
Another avenue for investigation would be to assess the formal in-
clusion of randomness. There may be merit in allowing panels to
classify grants into three categories: certain funding, certain rejec-
tion, or funding based on a random draw for proposals that are
difficult to discriminate (Graves et al., 2011, p. 4).
In addition to the variability of grant peer review, the group also
evaluated its cost. The cost of the grant peer review system can be
broken down into three components:
1. The cost of writing the applications (both successful and un-
successful), incurred by the applicants.
2. The cost of evaluating the proposals and deciding on which appli-
cation to fund, incurred by internal and external reviewers.
3. The administrative costs of the process, incurred by the funding
body.
According to Graves et al. (2011), in the funding exercise discussed
above, the largest of these costs was, by far, the cost incurred by the ap-
plicants, totalling 85% of the total cost of the exercise (p. 3). The authors
used full costing of the review process and administration budget, but only
a small sample of applicant reports. To complete their data, a more
comprehensive survey was conducted amongst the researchers who sub-
mitted applications to NHMRC in March 2012. The results of this survey,
discussed below, are reported in Herbert et al. (2013).
The authors received responses from 285 scientists who submitted
in total 632 proposals. These provide a representative sample of the
3570 proposals sent to NHMRC in March 2012, and display the same
success rate of 21%. Based on the survey results the authors estimated,
with a high degree of confidence, that 550 working years went into
writing the proposals for the March 2012 funding round. When
monetised based on the researchers’ salaries, this is equivalent to 14%
of the funding budget of NHMRC. New proposals took on average 38
days to prepare, and resubmissions took on average 28 days. The
average length of a proposal was 80–120 pages.
Using survey data, the authors also tried to detect a correlation be-
tween extra time spent on a proposal and the proposal's likelihood of being
funded. Surprisingly, no such correlation was found, and given the power
of the study this suggests that, on average, 10 extra days spent on a pro-
posal is likely to at most increase the likelihood of success by 2.8% (p. 3).
Based on their findings, the authors hypothesise the existence of a
curve which associates the accuracy of the peer review system in
evaluating the merit of a proposal to the amount of information pro-
vided by each applicant (Fig. 1). The hypothetical graph has certain
interesting features:
• The graph hypothesises the existence of an ‘ideal’, which is the
amount of information required for the optimal level of accuracy. In
the paper this level of accuracy appears close to, though not equal
to, 100%.• In the area left of the ‘ideal’, i.e. where the information provided is
less than the ideal amount, the graph displays diminishing returns,
such that equal increases in information provided results in less
increase in accuracy the more information has already been pro-
vided.• In the area right of the ‘ideal’, the graph displays an ‘overshoot’
effect, with accuracy decreasing as information increases. In the
text, this is explained by the claim that the reviewers are being
overburdened with too much information.
The authors rely on their result, that no statistically significant
correlation was found between extra time spent on a proposal and its
likelihood of success, to argue that the current amount of information
provided is more than the ideal. However, one does not follow the other
because increased accuracy does not imply higher merit for a proposal.
Nonetheless, the authors' description of reviewers having to read 50-
100 proposals of 80–120 pages does suggest an unnecessary cognitive
burden. Based on their hypothetical curve, the authors’ suggestions for
reducing the amount of information gathered implies a lower accuracy
for the peer review system. The authors believe this lowered accuracy is
justified, on cost/benefit grounds, even though in their model a high
level of accuracy is possible.
In addition to reinforcing many of Brezis’ key points, the key con-
tribution of the group can be seen as providing quantifiable measures
for bounded reviewer ability and the potential efficiency advantage of a
lottery. They draw a clear connection between cost and epistemic access.
3.4. Gillies
Gillies (2014) is the first published paper by a philosopher of science
to call for random allocation of research funds. The argument is de-
veloped from a critique of the peer review process written by Sir James
Black, a Nobel Laureate and discoverer of two blockbuster drugs. Black
argues that the slowdown in the rate of discovery of new drugs at the
beginning of the 21st century was not due to “the culling of low-
hanging fruit” (Gillies, 2014, p. 2), but rather due to a failure in the
system of peer review, a system that, according to Black, destroyed
scientific creativity. The anti-creative prejudice of peer review, Black
and Gillies argue, is believed throughout the research community,
leading researchers with creative ideas to keep silent about them and
instead seek funding for ‘safer’ projects. This effect is labelled by Black
as ‘undesirable feedback’.
Gillies argues that the failure of peer review in supporting creative
research stems from ‘researcher narcissism’ (Gillies, 2014, p. 8). Under
this condition, individual researchers believe their chosen approach to
the topic is the best possible approach. The first reason that ‘researcher
narcissism’ emerges is psychological. Each individual researcher spends
Fig. 1. The accuracy of peer review assessment as a function of information
provided. Reproduced from Herbert et al. (2013, Fig. 2, p. 5), published under
CCeBYeNC licence: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
legalcode.
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a lot of time choosing their approach, and in the process of choosing
they come up with reasons for justifying their eventual decision. These
reasons are likely to be shared by other researchers surrounding the
individual, as individuals choose a research community that will sup-
port their approach. This echoing of reasons further entrenches the
individuals' belief in the justification of the superiority of their chosen
approach. The second reason for the emergence of ‘researcher narcis-
sism’ is personal benefit. Individual researchers will enjoy more suc-
cessful careers if others, including funding bodies, awarding bodies, and
students, choose to endorse or follow the same approach as the in-
dividual researcher. Conversely, if the field rejects the approach of the
researcher, negative career consequences are likely to follow. This in-
centive to have one's own approach succeed will often lead individuals
to believe that it will indeed succeed, or at least behave as if this was
their belief.
While it is clear that in a heterogeneous research community not all
researchers can be justified in believing their chosen approach is the best
one, Gillies goes further to argue that virtually all researchers are mis-
taken in their ‘narcissist’ beliefs. This is “because no one really knows in
advance what research projects are going to succeed. This is because
research is, by definition, the exploration of things, which are as yet
unknown” (Gillies, 2014, p. 7). While not explicit in the 2014 piece, this
position echoes Gillies' Kuhnian reading of science, and his numerous
detailed case studies that show researchers under-valuing innovative
research from competing paradigms or research schools, an effect that is
amplified by peer review (Gillies, 1992, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012).
As an alternative to grant peer review, Gillies proposes selecting
which researchers to fund using random selection. Proposals will still be
generated by individual researchers, as they are under peer review, to
check that they fall within the field of the grant. In addition, applying
individuals will be evaluated for competence in the field of research
suggested, for example, by checking for qualifications such as a re-
search PhD, experience as a research assistant in other projects, or by
the applicant's track record of research and publication. These checks,
Gillies argues, would be relatively straightforward and much cheaper
than peer review, while still addressing the need to filter out ‘cranks’.9
Once proposals have been screened, a random selection is performed
from amongst the remaining proposals.
While Gillies considers the likely immediate response to be that
random selection will be less effective than peer review in supporting
good research, he argues that the converse is true, due to the wide-
spread systemic bias resulting from ‘researcher narcissism’ as described
above. Furthermore, it is envisaged that once peer review is removed
applicants will have no reason to opt for ‘safe’ proposals, and the level
of innovation in proposals will increase, thus leading to more creative
and beneficial research. Gillies proposes that random choice may first
be introduced in a restricted set of institutions, and research can then be
carried out to monitor the performance of random choice.
Largely we see Gillies repeating and reinforcing the key points we've
seen above, such as pilot of random allocation, efficiency advantage and
pre-lottery screening, as well as a more detailed account of the causes of
bounded researcher ability. Gillies also puts forward a more radical ver-
sion of lack of epistemic access. In addition to the above, two important
features should be noted about Gillies' work (especially when taking
into account his earlier papers and books):
Detailed historical examples: Cases where we are led to believe,
despite the difficulties of counterfactual historical reasoning, that
random allocation would have led to better outcomes than peer
review (e.g. zur Hausen, pharmaceutical R&D), or that peer review
would have led to worse outcomes than whatever system existed at
the time (e.g. Frege, Semmelweis, Wittgenstein).
Systemic effects of peer review: Beyond the immediate effect on
applicants in a funding round, Gillies draws out the systemic effect
on the balance between competing research programmes or para-
digms, and on the kinds of proposals individuals consider fundable.
Both of these systemic effects lead to a systemic reduction in di-
versity and creativity across the research community.
3.5. Avin
Another philosopher of science who has argued for science funding by
lottery is Avin (2015, 2017, 2018). Avin, like Brezis, utilises formal models
to explore the effect of different allocation mechanisms on collective
generation of epistemic progress. Unlike Brezis, though, Avin focuses on
long-term dynamic effects that emerge as a society of researchers explores
a scientific topic of interest. In that, Avin's work can be seen as belonging
to the growing literature on formal social epistemology.
Avin (2015, 2017) presents a modification of the epistemic land-
scape model of Weisberg and Muldoon (2009). Adapted from its ori-
ginal context in evolutionary biology, Weisberg and Muldoon's model
depicts a population of investigators exploring a hilly landscape, where
different coordinates of the landscape depict different approaches to the
study of a scientific topic of interest; the height at each coordinate in
the landscape corresponds to the significance of the results that would
accrue from pursuing the corresponding approach. The population of
investigators is seeded on the landscape at random, with each agent
having limited information about the landscape – only the significance
of immediately adjacent positions is known. In each simulation turn,
the agents follow simple rules, based on their individual characteristics,
in the aim of exploring more of the landscape and attaining significant
results. The performance of the entire community, rather than of in-
dividual agents, is then measured as the individual characteristics of the
agents (the rules they follow) are varied.
In Avin's model, the characteristics of individual agents remain the
same throughout the simulation. Avin, instead, varies the population
itself, through the funding mechanism in a process akin to selection, as
well as the topology of the landscape, as approaches gain or lose sig-
nificance in response to investigators' actions. In Avin's simulation, in-
vestigators need to propose to work on an approach; at every turn all
proposals are aggregated, and a subset is selected based on different
selection mechanisms, modelled to represent idealised versions of
funding mechanisms. The selected investigators are placed on the
landscape for a limited period, representing a time-limited grant, and
pursue their research; once the grant period is over, investigators
submit their results, and then re-apply for funding to pursue research on
the same, or one of the adjacent, research approaches. The selection
mechanisms modelled include the community's best estimate of the
merit of the proposal, based on past experience (akin to grant peer
review), a triage of proposals somewhat akin to Brezis' focal randomi-
sation, a completely random lottery, and automatic renewal such that
no new entrants are accepted.
In addition to modelling the population makeup as dynamic, Avin
also models the landscape as dynamic. When investigators complete
their grants, three effects are triggered:
1. The significance of the approach is significantly reduced, to reflect
the one-off nature of discovery.
2. The approach, and all nearby approaches, lose some significance
due to reduced novelty.
3. A new hill is added to the landscape in a random position to indicate
new research avenues.
When the population dynamics and landscape dynamics are taken
together, Avin's result indicate that funding by lottery can significantly
outperform funding by peer review.
9 The responsibility of science funding mechanisms to filter out ‘cranks’ has
been highlighted by Polanyi (1962) in a seminal paper which also presents a
strong defence of grant peer review against the foil of project selection by
government bureaucrats.
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Avin (2018) goes beyond the model, to consider the policy factors
that are required to bridge the model results and actual policy re-
commendations. Two factors of particular interest are the cost and fair-
ness of a lottery. On both aspects, a lottery compares favourably to peer
review, as effort required by applicants is significantly reduced, and bias
is eliminated (even if that bias is unknown). Avin notes, however, that for
these benefits to accrue, the lottery's entry criteria need to be minimal,
which could undermine accountability, and so a pre-screening solution is
proposed that can capture some fairness and efficiency gains, as well as
the effectiveness gains indicated by the model, while maintaining a high
degree of accountability. Avin concludes with a list of certain domains
where, according to the model or other policy considerations, a lottery
should not be applied, for example in applied research with an urgent
deadline, in very well-established narrow fields where the ‘terrain’ of
open questions is thoroughly mapped out, and in cases of ‘Big Science’,
where very large sums are awarded to individual projects employing
hundreds or thousands of researchers.
3.6. Fang and Casadevall
Fang and Casadevall (2016) provide the most recent published paper
calling for funding by lottery, and in some sense the most ambitious, as it
calls for the introduction of random allocation at the NIH, the world's
largest funder of basic research. Fang and Casadevall are biomedical
researchers, and their proposal is partly based on their previous research
(Fang, Bowen, &Casadevall, 2016) that showed reviewers' scores of the
top 20% of applications are a very weak predictor of grant productivity
(in terms of numbers of publications and citations). The focus on the top
20% matters, as Fang and Casadevall argue that peer review is no longer
effective, due to falling success rates. They accept that reviewers are able
to broadly distinguish between meritorious and non-meritorious propo-
sals, but reject (with the evidence above) reviewers' ability to make fine
grained distinctions amongst the meritorious.10Note that contra Brezis,
Fang and Casadevall thus argue that the greatest uncertainty is near the
top of the pile, not in the middle.
Beyond low reliability in distinguishing amongst meritorious pro-
jects, Fang and Casadevall list all the objections to peer review that we
are by now familiar with: conservatism, bias (they note specifically
concerns about gender and race bias), and large time investments. Of
these, they consider bias to be the main reason to shift to a lottery, once
the lack of reliability of peer review is acknowledged:
Although the proposed system could bring some cost savings, we
emphasize that the primary advantage of a modified lottery would
be to make the system fairer by eliminating sources of bias. The
proposed system should improve research workforce diversity, as
any female or underrepresented minority applicant who submits a
meritorious application will have an equal chance of being awarded
funding (Fang & Casadevall, 2016, p. 5).
Fang and Casadevall provide extensive details about their proposed
lottery system. In addition to pre-lottery screening, they propose:
Automatic re-entrance to future lotteries: This would apply to
those proposals that have been deemed meritorious in the pre-
screening, but failed to win the lottery. This has two claimed ad-
vantages: it frees up the time of applicants who would otherwise be
writing new proposals every year, and it allows institution admin-
istrators to plan ahead given the number of proposals from their
institution that are waiting for their lucky turn.
Limit to one proposal per applicant: This is to avoid abuse of the
system, and to give all researchers who have produced meritorious
proposals equal chances.
Detailed feedback only for rejected applications: This is to allow
authors of failed applications to revise and resubmit in future pre-
screening rounds.
Separate lottery for newcomers: This is to guarantee a good re-
presentation amongst the funding portfolio for new entrants, in-
creasing diversity.
Funders can hand-pick winners: Programme officers (who
manage NIH funding) could use various payment mechanisms at
their disposal to provide funds for researchers who end up parti-
cularly unlucky, or if a field is at risk of drying up due to a series of
unsuccessful draws.
Fang and Casadevall conclude with ten benefits of funding by their
modified lottery over current NIH practices. Most of these are familiar
from the above works, but the last is worth mentioning: as the lottery
will make visible the number of meritorious projects who are going
unfunded from year to year, it will help signal the amount of untapped
research potential to funders, politicians, and the public, and may help
garner more resources for research.
4. Analytic synthesis
We have seen several arguments put forward to support science
funding by random allocation. These have emerged from diverse cor-
ners of academia, and utilise a wide range of tools to support the ar-
guments: closed-form models (Brezis), novel data collection (Barnett
et al.), historical examples (Gillies), agent based simulations (Avin), and
surveys of empirical findings (Fang and Casadevall). Here I aim to put
together a single coherent synthesis that explains the basic thrust of the
argument supporting the policy, as well as points of disagreement that
explain the variations we see between different implementations of this
policy (and further variations we may see in the future).
P1. Selection by peer evaluation is the natural policy ‘foil’, as it is
the dominant form of funding.
P2. Peer evaluation is used to provide a reliable and accountable
measurement of proposal merit, such that public funds could be
spent on the best science.
P3. The cost of peer evaluation is composed of the cost of preparing
proposals, of reviewing them, and of administering the process. Of
these, proposal preparation is the largest cost. The costs increase as
the level of detail asked for in the proposals increases.
P4. Qua measurement, at least in some domains, peer review is
subject to random errors, or at least does not offer a good cost-
benefit trade-off at the level of accuracy sought:
P4a. General argument from cluelessness: research is inherently
about venturing into the unknown, precluding any ability to
evaluate project merit ex ante.
P4b. Specific argument from cluelessness: most research is in-
cremental and can therefore be reliably evaluated ex ante, but
some research projects are highly innovative, which precludes an
accurate evaluation of their merit. However, these are some of the
most valuable research projects. Reviewer disagreement may be
an indicator that a proposal is highly innovative.
P4c. Lack-of-accuracy argument: like all measurements, peer re-
view is subject to random errors, which limit its ability to make
fine-grained distinctions between proposals even if coarse grained
distinctions are possible, e.g. between meritorious and non-mer-
itorious projects.
P4d. Cost addendum to lack-of-accuracy argument: like most
measurement procedures, there are diminishing returns to accu-
racy from information provided, such that much more informa-
tion is required from applicants to make fine grained distinctions
than is required for coarse grained distinctions.
10 A recent study, that replicated the NIH funding process, further supports
the claim that reviewers do not agree amongst themselves on the relative merit
of high-quality proposals, and therefore calls for a consideration of a modified
lottery proposal (Pier et al., 2018).
S. Avin Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
7
P5. A main putative shortcoming of funding by lottery is its lack of
reliability, but if it comes close to or matches the reliability of peer
review in some domains, then other features of the lottery will make
it a more favourable selection mechanism.
P6. In addition to random errors, peer review, at least in some do-
mains, is also subject to systemic errors, or biases. These affect both
reliability and fairness:
P6a. Researcher narcissism: all reviewers are biased with regards
to their own research agenda and competing research agendas.
These biases compound when a field is composed of competing
schools of thought, or when an existing paradigm is challenged by
a new one.
P6b. On top of (P4b), which indicates lack of accuracy when
evaluating radically novel proposals, there may also be bias
against novel research, as part of or in addition to (P6a).
P6c. Apart from bias for/against ideas and projects, there can be
biases for/against individuals, individual characteristics (such as
race and gender), institutions and network membership.
P7. With regards to bias for/against ideas, applicants are in-
centivised to learn and adapt to these biases, creating a feedback
loop.
P8. A lottery is an inherently unbiased selection mechanism.
P9. A selection mechanism needs to maintain accountability.
Specifically, awarding grants to proposals that are considered, by
consensus, to be low quality should be avoided (though this may
clash with P4a and P6a).
P10. There is currently only little, and somewhat controversial, data
on the accuracy and bias of peer review. Such data is hard to come
by.
P11. There is currently very little data on how funding by lottery
works/will work in practice.
C1. In areas where the reliability of peer review is low (defined by
which of P4 and P6 sub-premises one accepts), a lottery should be
trialled as an alternative funding mechanism with potentially better
effectiveness and efficiency.
C2. Unless one is very concerned about P4a and/or P6a, proposals
and/or applicants should be pre-screened to maintain (coarse-
grained) accountability while still reducing costs and (some) bias.
C3. At present, funding lotteries should be run as trial policies with a
small subset of all available funds, and outcomes should be com-
pared to the outcomes of funding by peer review.
Versions of the argument above play out in the justification for the
funding by-lottery policies surveyed in §5. We should, however, also
notice the absence of certain arguments, to do with power and control,
which I will only sketch here.
4.1. Control of funding
There is an ongoing debate over who should control scientific re-
search, the state or the scientific community (Bernal, 1939; Polanyi,
1962; Greenberg, 1999, 2003).11 The main argument for control by the
scientific community over state funds (albeit with appropriate oversight
and accountability mechanisms) is that the scientific community is best
positioned to judge which research avenues are most promising, which
researchers are most competent, and which proposals are most plau-
sible and meritorious. Radical scepticism about the ability of the sci-
entific community, as suggested by some who support funding by lot-
tery, threatens the status quo, and a shift of power to the state.
In particular, it is important to differentiate two readings of the
lottery proposal. On a per-project reading, the lottery implies that any
project is as good as any other – in which case state officials, or other
interested parties, may argue for picking their favourites. On the social
level, however, such exercise of control would be precisely antithetical
to the aims of the lottery, which is to eliminate bias – it is the dis-
tribution generated by the lottery, rather than the individual projects
chosen, that makes the lottery favourable. If, however, it would be
difficult to defend this distinction and sustain the lottery in the long run
from interventions by interested parties, then the lottery proposal may
well end up backfiring.
4.2. Personal benefits from reviewing proposals
We often talk about the cost for reviewers, in terms of time wasted
in reading tall stacks of proposals and endless meetings with bad coffee.
However, the researchers who sit on reviewing panels, often quite se-
nior and accomplished in their field, also gain certain benefits from the
process. Gillies (2014) hints at one of these: as long as the scientific
community is divided over the best framework, theory or approach in a
certain domain (which is often the case), reviewers get to exercise some
power over the battle, towards the position they most strongly identify
with. This, in fact, is expected of them, as it is part of the exercise of their
expertise. On a more humdrum level, the slow process of scientific
publication means that reviewers gain privileged access to scientific
progress and plans made by their peers.
As one reviewer notes, the loss of such benefits to proposal re-
viewers is in no way part of the normative criticism of the lottery
proposal; rather, it is a factor that may explain why some actors might
be less willing to implement such proposals. Since there is a high degree
of overlap between the senior scientists who sit on grant review panels,
and the scientific advisors who are likely to consult on matters of sci-
ence policy, including on the overall mechanism of science funding,
there may be personal incentives to support the status quo and reject
proposals that would diminish reviewers’ benefits. Note, however, that
most policy proposals of funding by lottery involve pre-screening by
experts, such that reviewers retain at least some of the benefits dis-
cussed.
5. Current examples of random allocation of research funds
The above summarises the arguments in the literature for formally
introducing a random selection element into science funding. As men-
tioned in the framing of the paper, however, this is no longer a merely
theoretical debate: there are now at least three science funders who
employ random selection as part of their funding mechanisms, surveyed
below.12
5.1. New Zealand Health Research Council – Explorer Grants
In 2013, the New Zealand Health Research Council (HRC) launched
a new funding stream, titled ‘Explorer Grants’, to promote transfor-
mative research HRC (2017). Explorer Grants are available in any
health research discipline and are worth NZ$150,000 for a term of up to
24 months. Applicants are required to provide a brief project proposal
(circa 10 pages for the entire application in 2017). The proposals are
anonymised and presented to a panel for initial evaluation of trans-
formative potential and viability. Applications that pass the initial
screening are submitted to a lottery, and the lottery winners are funded.
Unlucky proposals which fail to win the lottery can be resubmitted in
11 In recent decades attention has largely shifted to questions of corporate
control, but for basic research the main locus of funding, and therefore debate
over control, is at the state level.
12 The Foundational Questions Institute (FQXi) used to run a mini-grants
program via lottery, which received a mention as the only such policy at the
time in a policy review of alternatives to grant peer review (Guthrie et al.,
2013). These grants are of a much smaller scale than the funding streams
surveyed below, and at the time of writing were not accepting new applications,
and so are not included in this survey.
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subsequent rounds.
These are the numbers of applicants and grants awarded to date:
Year # Applications # Awards
2013 116 3
2014 24 4
2015 45 4
2016 38 9
2017 34 11
From the above, there have been 31 grants awarded to date (all involving
random selection), for a total amount of NZ$4.65M (US$3.25M in current ex-
change rates).
5.2. Volkswagen Foundation – experiment!
The Volkswagen Foundation (VolkswagenStiftung) is the largest
private research funding foundation in Germany, with an annual
funding volume of around 150 million euros. It has been running the
‘Experiment!’ funding stream since 2012, with the objective of:
an exploration of fundamentally new research topics disregarding a high
project risk and the vagueness of a successful outcome. The funding is
meant for an exploratory phase, which is limited with respect to dura-
tion and finance, in order to demonstrate preliminary evidence for the
concept's potential. In case of disappointment the scientific explanation
of obstacles is a desired result (VolkswagenStiftung, 2017).
Grants are awarded for up to EUR 120,000 and 1.5 years, and cover
“experiments and theory in science, engineering, behavioral and life
sciences (VolkswagenStiftung, 2017).
The 2017-2020 funding rounds are expected to award 30–40 grants
per year, doubling the amount from the 2013–2016 period. The first
years of the program saw around 500 applications per year.
Applicants are required to submit brief proposals (circa 5 pages). An
initial screening takes place by Foundation staff to guarantee proposals
meet the program criteria; this stage filters down from 500 applications
to 120–140 proposals. In a second stage, the applications that passed the
initial screening are presented to an international and interdisciplinary
jury, which selects the 15–20 most promising applications (akin to peer
review, though no written evaluations are produced); during this process,
each jury member is given a single ‘funding joker’ which they can use to
propose consideration of an application that does not reach consensus.
In the 2017–2020 rounds, a second mechanism will be introduced in
the second selection stage, whereby in addition to the 15–20 proposals
selected by the jury, an additional 15–20 proposals will be selected at
random from the qualifying proposals. Applicants will not know whe-
ther their proposals have been selected by the jury or have been lucky
in the lottery. The lottery selection is considered to be in ‘trial phase’,
and will be re-evaluated in 2020.
Given the details above, it is estimated that during 2017–2020 there
will be 70 proposals selected by lottery, for a value of up to EUR 8.4M
(US$9.9M in current exchange rates).
5.3. New Zealand science for Technological Innovation challenge – Seed
Projects
The Science for Technological Innovation challenge (SfTI) is one of
New Zealand's 11 National Science Challenges. It was launched in 2015
as “a 10-year, multi-million-dollar investment aimed at growing a fu-
ture high-tech New Zealand economy.” (Science for Technological
Innovation, 2017) In 2016 and 2017 SfTI offered funding for ‘Seed
Projects’, which are intended to bring new people with fresh ideas into
the SfTI Challenge. They align with the SfTI Challenge Research Themes
and involve high-risk research with potentially high rewards (Science
for Technological Innovation, 2017).
Funded Seed Projects receive up to NZ$100,000 per year, and last
for up to three years (2016 round) or two years (2017 round). A portion
of the funding pool is reserved for Vision Mātauranga, which “aims to
unlock the science and innovation potential of Māori knowledge, re-
sources and people for the benefit of all New Zealanders.” (Science for
Technological Innovation, 2017) In 2016, projects were selected by a
panel, in a system akin to peer review. In 2017, however, the panel only
provided initial screening for matching the eligibility criteria, both of
the challenge in general and of Vision Mātauranga, and were entered
into two corresponding ballots. A total of 18 projects were selected from
the ballots, out of 79 applications, for a total worth of NZ$3M (US
$2.1M in current exchange rates). There are currently no plans to fund
more Seed Projects as part of the SfTI challenge.
6. Comparison between policies and arguments
How do the policies surveyed above compare to the proposals that
emerge from the arguments for funding by lottery? To what extent do they
follow arguments from cluelessness, lack of accuracy, or cost? How do they
deal with fairness and accountability issues? These are not always explicit,
but we can look at policy elements that may serve as proxies for these
concerns. For proxies of accountability, we can see if institutional affiliation
is required, if pre-lottery screening is required, and whether the funder
follows up with awardees to check progress and quality of outputs. For
proxies of concerns regarding effectiveness of selection, we can look at the
kind of proposals accepted (only transformative research?), the composition
of reviewers per proposal (specific peers, broad interdisciplinary panels, or
light touch filtering by the institution's staff), the extent to which a random
lottery is used, whether reviewer scores affect lottery chances (e.g. as a
weighted lottery or in a focal randomisation process), and whether appli-
cants that fail the lottery are allowed to resubmit. For proxies of fairness
concerns, we can look at whether proposals are anonymised, and whether
fairness is explicitly mentioned as a benefit of lottery selection. For proxies
of efficiency, we can look at whether proposals are required to be short, and
whether detailed plans and budgets are mandatory.
A comparison of the policies across these characteristics is presented
in the following table:
Characteristic Explorer Grants Experiment! Seed Projects
Just transformative research Yes Yes Yes
Need institutional affiliation Yes Yes Yes
Pre-lottery screening Yes Yes Yes
Screening done by Experts Staff Experts
Random selection All Half All
Reviews affect lottery No No No
Short proposals Yes Yes Unknown
Detailed budget required No No No
Explicit fairness reasoning No No Yes
Anonymous proposals Yes Yes No
Allow resubmission Yes Unknown Yes
Post-funding monitoring Yes Yes Yes
One clear difference between the implemented policies and the
proposals in the literature is that the policies only apply for a small
subset of R&D, namely transformative research; this contrasts with the
arguments which each see themselves as applying to all R&D, or at least
all basic research.13 By limiting their scope, the implemented policies
13 There are also several related philosophical puzzles here: why is it that
noticing the lack of a certain collective property (novelty) in a class of objects
(research outputs) does not lead to new action, but carving out (and officially
naming) a sub-class of the original class (transformative research), that is
identified by certain values of that property (high novelty), does enable such
policy change? Can research projects be carved into transformative and non-
transformative in practice? Can they be so separated ex ante? Why is it desirable
to have any non-transformative research? A survey of transformative research,
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shy away from directly attacking the established mechanism of grant
peer review, which is something all arguments in the literature do.
Indeed, all implemented lottery mechanisms are operated by funders
who also run other funding streams, where the selection mechanism for
other, non-transformative, funding streams is grant peer review. It may
be that data on the results of these trial policies will be required before
traditional funding streams will consider shifting from grant peer re-
view to random selection — it is easier to try something new than to
change an existing policy.
From the above it is clear that the implemented policies lean more
on the side of Fang and Casadevall, in seeing lotteries as a way to make
funding of transformative research more efficient (shorter proposals)
and to remove explicit biases (anonymised proposals or explicit state-
ment that lotteries contribute to fairness). They do not follow Brezis'
prescription of utilising reviewer disagreement to mark proposals for
random selection, nor Graves et al.‘s proposal of triage, though the pre-
filtering for transformative research may be seen as providing this
function. They also do not follow Gillies' more extreme version of
concern regarding ‘research narcissism’, as they require both institu-
tional affiliation and passing a pre-filtering panel, which leaves space
for bias to sneak back in, though the interdisciplinary makeup of the
panel may correct for this bias to some extent. The Experiment! pro-
gram is explicitly described as a pilot, and is run alongside panel se-
lection, which matches with the general observation that evidence on
funding selection is lacking, and more data is required to compare
between alternative mechanisms. Another data gathering exercise is
being run alongside the Explorer Grants program (Barnett, Graves,
Clarke, & Blakely, 2015). For all three streams, it is too early to tell
whether they had the kinds of effects that the academic arguments for
lottery suggest, but preliminary results are expected in the next few
years; more comprehensive comparisons, however, may require much
longer, as the value of some research projects is only revealed long after
publication, in the case of so-called ‘sleeping beauty’ papers (Ke,
Ferrara, Radicchi, & Flammini, 2015).
7. A note on impact
How did we get from the world of 1998, that had one Lancet article
on funding by lottery, to the world of 2017, with three funding streams
implementing (some version of) that policy? The full story will need to
be uncovered by historians or sociologists of science policy, but it is
helpful to track the way these arguments have related to each other in
the literature.
While concerns about various shortcomings of grant peer review
have existed for decades, there has been little systematic evaluation of
the process (Guthrie et al., 2017). Given this background, integrative
interdisciplinary reviews of alternatives to peer review have had a
significant role to play in shaping alternative policies. Ioannidis (2011),
published in the interdisciplinary journal Nature, presents a harsh cri-
ticism of current funding practices, and surveys a range of possible
measures for improvement, including funding by lottery (citing Graves
et al.‘s work on the randomness in current selection methods). Guthrie,
Guerin, Wu, Ismail, and Wooding (2013) presents a comprehensive
policy-oriented survey of the literature on alternatives to grant peer
review. The report was produced by RAND Europe, a think tank often
contracted by governments and large funders with a long history of
informing policy decisions. In the section of funding by lottery, the
report references Ioannidis's review, as well as Graves et al.‘s results and
Brezis's model. This RAND Europe report was cited by a New Zealand
government review of the Health Research Council's Explorer Grants
program (HRC, 2014).
The full citation graph for the works discussed in this paper is
presented in Fig. 2.14 Without drawing too many conclusions from a
very limited sample size, it seems that philosophy of science could be
doing better in engaging the audiences that are relevant for increasing
the allocation of resources to help promote scientific novelty.
8. Conclusion
The world in 2018 contains three research funding streams that
allocate funds randomly amongst qualifying proposals. Though their
total funding amount is negligible when compared to the global basic R
&D funding budget, the near-total dominance of funding by peer review
as the gold standard of science funding since World War Two marks
these policies as surprising changes to the landscape. This surprise is
also partly attributable to the non-intuitive idea of funding by lottery,
despite arguments being put forward to attempt such policies starting
two decades ago. Looking at all the different arguments for randomised
funding as a whole, we can see a common structure emerging that
emphasises the faults and biases in peer review as a failure to accurately
measure (or predict) future research quality, in particular when eval-
uating novel research. Given this argument, a novel mechanism is
proposed – randomisation of selection post initial filtering – that either
cuts superfluous investment in useless evaluation (the cost saving ar-
gument for lottery) or eliminates harmful bias in selection (the pro-
novelty and pro-diversity argument for lottery). While disagreements
remain between versions of the argument, and enough uncertainties
remain to support different specific implementations, it seems
Greenberg (1998)
Graves et al (2011) Ioannidis (2011)
Brezis (2007)
Gillies (2014)Avin (2015)Guthrie et al (2013)
HRC (2014) Fang and Casadevall (2016)
Fig. 2. Partial citation graph for works discussing science funding by random
allocation.
(footnote continued)
its philosophy, limits and criticisms, is beyond the scope of this paper. It should
be noted, however, that the way science policy institutions conceptualise sci-
ence has a direct effect on the policies they are willing to entertain. It should
also be noted that the origin of transformative research as a science policy
category is linked to Kuhn's picture of science as divided into Normal and
Revolutionary. It shouldn't be news that ideas from philosophy of science travel
far, or that their criticisms travel much more slowly (if at all). It might be more
surprising, at least to some, that large sums of money depend on such concepts,
or that the time it takes for them to play out is measured in decades.
14 Where authors have published more than once on the topic of funding by
lottery, I have picked the earliest publication. Later publications (including this
one) show more citations across disciplines, including from non-philosophy
papers to philosophy of science papers on this topic, though there are yet no
citation paths from policy reports such as HRC (2014) to works in philosophy of
science.
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justifiable to run these policies as trial versions to learn more about the
outcomes. This is now happening, and provides an opportunity for
engagement for social epistemologists, for philosophers interested in
contributing to good policy, and for the (highly valuable, from a re-
searcher narcissism perspective) intersection of these two groups.
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